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1. Introduction  
The financial crisis of 2008 has demonstrated that market-wide liquidity can strongly 
influence financial markets. In principle, such systematic liquidity shocks should depend upon 
the state of the real economy. Although previous studies find that national monetary policy 
variables predict aggregate liquidity, the evidence that real national economic factors affect 
capital market liquidity is relatively weak (e.g., Fujimoto (2003), Choi and Cook (2005), 
Chordia, Sarkar, and Subrahmanyam (2005), Sauer (2007)).  
In this study, we examine whether the link between macroeconomic variables and 
liquidity is stronger at the state-level. Specifically, we posit that local economic conditions 
would affect the liquidity of local firms more than national macroeconomic variables. Our main 
hypothesis is that if a significant portion of the ownership and trading of stocks is local, and local 
economic conditions affect the risk aversion of local investors, then local economic conditions 
should affect local investors’ willingness to trade. As a result, there would be a common factor in 
the liquidity of local firms that varies with the local economic conditions.  
This conjecture is motivated by the recent evidence of segmentation of U.S. capital 
markets and the strong preference for local stocks by local investors. In particular, there is 
mounting evidence that U.S. capital markets are geographically segmented. Becker (2007) shows 
that U.S. bank loan markets are segmented. Korniotis (2008) and Korniotis and Kumar (2013) 
find that U.S. state-level heterogeneity in economic conditions explains the variation in the 
cross-section of stock returns.  
Concurrently, other recent studies show that stock trading activity is localized. For 
example, Loughran and Schultz (2004) find that firms in areas affected by extreme weather 
experience lower trading volume. Loughran and Schultz (2005) find that firms in urban areas 
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have higher liquidity than firms in rural areas. Shive (2012) shows that large power outages are 
associated with lower stock turnover for firms headquartered in the area. The joint evidence of 
localized trading and geography-induced market segmentation suggests that local economic 
conditions can affect local stock liquidity.   
To formalize our empirical predictions, we rely on the theoretical framework of Vayanos 
and Wang (2012a; hereafter VW2012). Building on the empirical and theoretical literature on 
liquidity1, VW2012 develop a model, which predicts that asset liquidity levels decrease when 
investors’ risk aversion levels and asset return volatility levels are higher, and when there are 
fewer liquidity suppliers. The evidence of localized trading and the relation between local risk 
aversion and local economic conditions suggest that the liquidity primitives in VW2012 (i.e., risk 
aversion, asset return volatility, proportion of liquidity suppliers, and information asymmetry) 
should depend on local business cycles. Therefore, there should be a direct relation between 
current local economic indicators and the subsequent liquidity of local stocks. 
To test this hypothesis, we use multiple measures of stock liquidity and construct 
quarterly state-level liquidity indices of all the firms headquartered in each state. We find that 
there is a strong relation between state-level economic conditions and subsequent state-level 
liquidity. Specifically, the liquidity of stocks headquartered in a state dries up (increases) 
following deteriorating (improving) local economic conditions. This finding is robust to the 
choice of estimation methods, estimation period, and control variables. Our control variables 
include U.S. macroeconomic indicators, lagged levels of liquidity of the local firms, the average 
market capitalization of local firms and the past, contemporaneous, and future stock returns of 
local firms. We also replicate our analysis using more disaggregated data from Metropolitan 
                                                 
1 For example, see Stoll (1978), Amihud and Mendelson (1986), He and Wang (1995), Gromb and Vayanos (2002), 
Huang (2003), Chen, Lesmond, and Wei (2007), Edwards, Harris, and Piwowar (2007) and Bao, Pan, and Wang 
(2011). For a comprehensive review see Amihud, Mendelson and Pedersen (2005) and Vayanos and Wang (2012b).  
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Statistical Areas (MSA). Due to data restrictions, the MSA economic activity index is annual but 
it is still statistically and positively related to next-year MSA firm liquidity. 
Additional tests show that the relation between local liquidity and economic conditions is 
weaker when firm localness is lower, i.e., among larger or S&P500 firms. Moreover, consistent 
with the evidence in Loughran and Schultz (2005), we find that the effect of local economic 
conditions on liquidity is stronger in rural states where liquidity is scarcer, and this link is yet 
stronger prior to the advent of decimalization in 2001. 
Next, we examine whether the degree of local ownership and trading is a channel through 
which local economic conditions influence local liquidity. Since the local ownership and local 
trading intensity are known to be disproportionately high (e.g., Coval and Moskowitz (1999), 
Huberman (2001), Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2005), Bodnaruk (2009), Seasholes and Zhu (2010), 
and Becker, Cronqvist, and Fahlenbrach (2011)), the risk aversion of local investors should 
influence the liquidity of local stocks. Moreover, because local economic conditions affect local 
risk aversion (Korniotis and Kumar (2013)), the relation between local economic conditions and 
local liquidity should be stronger when local ownership and trading of local stocks are higher.  
We also investigate whether tighter local funding constraints and greater opacity in local 
information environments amplify the effect of local economic conditions on local liquidity. This 
analysis is based on the theoretical models and empirical evidence that demonstrate that liquidity 
should be lower when investors face tighter funding constraints or more opaque information 
environments (e.g., Gromb and Vayanos (2002), Eisfeldt (2004), Anshuman and Viswanathan 
(2005), Taddei (2007), Garleanu and Pedersen (2007), Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), 
Hameed, Kang, and Viswanathan (2010)).  
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Our empirical evidence is consistent with the conjecture that local capital market 
conditions affect the local primitives of liquidity and thus the liquidity of local stocks, both 
directly and by amplifying the effect of local economic conditions on local liquidity. 
Specifically, we show that the effect of local economic conditions on local liquidity is stronger 
when local ownership and trading levels are higher, local funding constraints are more binding, 
and the local information environment is more opaque.  
Overall, our empirical results provide evidence that macroeconomic conditions do affect 
liquidity. More importantly, the macroeconomic conditions that matter are the local ones. This 
finding is consistent with the evidence on the geographical segmentation in U.S. capital markets 
and with the evidence of localized trading. Moreover, our evidence complements the findings in 
Næs, Skjeltorp, and Ødegaard (2011) by showing that, in contrast to other existing studies, there 
is in fact a significant link between real economic factors and future liquidity levels.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we develop our main 
hypotheses. In Section 3, we describe the data sources and variables used in our tests. We present 
the empirical evidence in Sections 4 to 6 and conclude in Section 7. 
2. Related Literature and Testable Hypotheses  
We organize our empirical analyses around two hypotheses, which we motivate using the 
Vayanos and Wang (2012a) model.  
2.1  Local Economic Conditions and Local Liquidity 
There are two types of risk-averse investors in the VW2012 model: liquidity demanders 
and suppliers. Liquidity demanders receive an endowment correlated with the returns of the risky 
assets. This correlation gives liquidity demanders an incentive to hedge endowment risk and, 
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initiate trading. Under full information, the price impact of trades initiated by liquidity 
demanders (i.e., λ) is given by: 
(1)                                                 ߣ ൌ ఈఙమଵିగ	,  
where α is the investor risk aversion, ߪଶ is the volatility of the risky asset, and (1 െ ߨ) is the 
fraction of liquidity suppliers.  
This relation implies that liquidity would be low when risk aversion is high, asset 
volatility is high, and the proportion of liquidity suppliers is low. We conjecture that the three 
model primitives, i.e., α, σ2, and (1 - π), would vary with the local business cycle due to 
geographical segmentation of U.S. financial markets and localized trading. Therefore, our first 
main hypothesis posits that: 
H1: There is a positive relation between local economic conditions and subsequent 
liquidity of local stocks.  
Existing empirical evidence provides the motivation for this conjecture. First, Korniotis 
and Kumar (2013) demonstrate that the local investors’ risk aversion increases when local 
economic conditions deteriorate. Prior studies also show that stock ownership and trading are 
disproportionately concentrated around firm headquarters (e.g., Coval and Moskowitz (1999, 
2001), Loughran and Schultz (2004, 2005) and Shive (2012)). Thus, we conjecture that 
worsening local economic conditions would result in higher risk aversion α and, according to the 
VW2012 model, higher illiquidity (λ) among local stocks.  
Second, prior studies show that there is an inverse relation between equity market 
volatility and the business cycle (e.g., Schwert (1989a), (1989b); Mele (2008)). Recent evidence 
in Bernile, Kumar, and Sulaeman (2013) also demonstrates that there is a significant local 
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component in stock returns. This evidence suggests that local economic conditions would have a 
negative effect on local asset volatility and in turn the liquidity of local assets.  
Last, local economic conditions may affect local investors’ propensity to act as liquidity 
suppliers or demanders. Deteriorating local economic conditions can limit local investors’ ability 
to supply liquidity because either their income/wealth is negatively affected by local recessions 
or they want to reduce their exposure to local risk. Thus, deteriorating local conditions would 
decrease the proportion of liquidity suppliers, (1 െ ߨ), and increase illiquidity (λ) of local assets.  
2.2   Local Capital Markets and Amplification Mechanisms 
Local capital market conditions can affect the link between local economic conditions 
and local liquidity. Existing studies suggest three sets of factors that can generate state-level 
variation in firm liquidity: (i) local institutional ownership and trading of local stocks, (ii) local 
funding constraints, and (iii) opaqueness of local information environments.  
In VW2012, the risk aversion (α) of investors trading an asset determines asset illiquidity 
(ߣ). Given that the risk aversion of local investors is more sensitive to local conditions (e.g., 
Korniotis and Kumar (2013)), we expect high local stock ownership and/or trading imbalances 
between local and non-local investors would strengthen the relation between local economic 
conditions and local liquidity. 
Another important determinant of ߣ is the proportion of investors trading the stock that 
act as liquidity suppliers. Theory suggests that market liquidity drops after large negative market-
wide shocks because the collateral values of financial intermediaries decrease and funding 
constraints become more binding, forcing asset holders to liquidate (e.g., Kyle and Xiong (2001), 
Gromb and Vayanos (2002), Anshuman and Viswanathan (2005), Brunnermeier and Pedersen 
(2009)). We expect that local funding constraints would limit local investors’ ability to provide 
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liquidity. Therefore, higher local funding constraints would reduce the liquidity of local stocks 
directly. Further, those constraints would amplify the effects of local economic variables through 
their impact on other primitives of the model (i.e., risk aversion and asset volatility). 
VW2012 also analyze the case of asymmetrically informed investors. They show that the 
presence of privately informed liquidity demanders increases illiquidity, both directly and by 
amplifying the impact of other primitives of the model, i.e., α, ߪଶ, and (1 െ ߨ). We cannot 
observe the precision of local private information signals. Instead, we rely on the notion that a 
more opaque local information environment would exacerbate information asymmetries between 
local and nonlocal investors. In turn, we posit that higher opacity of the local environment would 
reduce stock liquidity directly and amplify the indirect effects of local economic variables.2 
Based on the discussion above, our second hypothesis posits that: 
H2: The relation between local economic conditions and local liquidity is amplified when 
(i) the shareholder base is more local, (ii) there are larger differences in trading of local 
stocks by local and non-local investors, (iii) local funding constraints are more binding, 
and (iv) the local information environment is more opaque. 
3. Data and Variables 
 We use data from multiple sources to test our two main hypotheses. In this section, we 
describe the main data sources and variables used in our empirical analysis.  
3.1  State-Level Liquidity  
The liquidity level of local stocks is the central variable of interest in our tests. In our 
main tests, we use two established measures of stock liquidity: (i) Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity 
                                                 
2 This conjecture is also supported by other theories, which show that firm opacity can result in pro-cyclical liquidity 
(e.g., Eisfeldt (2004), Taddei (2007)). 
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measure and (ii) relative spreads.3 The Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure is based on Kyle’s 
(1985) lambda. This variable captures the daily price impact of the order flow and is defined as 
the ratio of the absolute value of the daily stock return to its dollar volume. The relative spread 
measure is the ratio of the daily closing bid-ask spread divided by the midpoint of the daily 
closing bid-ask spread. All liquidity measures are calculated using data on common stocks (share 
code of 10 or 11) from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP).  
Given that state-level economic conditions can only be measured on a quarterly basis, we 
conduct our tests using state-quarter observations. To estimate Amihud (2002) illiquidity and 
relative spread in state j and quarter q, we use the following log-average index: 
(2)                          ܵݐܽݐ݁	ܮ݅ݍ	ሺ݆, ݍሻ ൌ 	ܮ݋݃൫∑ ௜߱,௤ିଵ௝ ൫∑ ܮ݅ݍ௜,ௗ,௤௝ொௗୀଵ /ܳ൯ே௜ୀଵ ൯. 
Here, ܮ݅ݍ௜,ௗ,௤௝  is the daily liquidity estimate for stock i headquartered in state j on day d in quarter 
q; Q is the total number of trading days for stock i in quarter q; ௜߱,௤ିଵ
௝  is stock i’s market 
capitalization scaled by the aggregate market capitalization of all firms located in the same state 
at the end of quarter q−1; N is the number of stocks headquartered in state j; and Log indicates 
the natural logarithm function. Due to the non-normality of state-quarter liquidity measures, we 
use the natural logarithm of these measures in all empirical tests. 
3.2 Local Economic Activity 
We use several macroeconomic variables in our analysis. Specifically, following 
Korniotis and Kumar (2013), we focus on the relative unemployment rate (US Rel Un, State Rel 
Un), the labor income growth rate (US Inc Gr, State Inc Gr), and the housing collateral ratio (US 
                                                 
3 The robustness tests contained in the internet Appendix use three other alternative measures of liquidity: Corwin 
and Schultz (2012) spreads, Lesmond, Ogden, and Trzcinka (1999) (LOT) measure, and stock turnover. See Internet 
Appendix Tables A3 and A7. 
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hy, State hy). The choice of these economic indicators is motivated by previous studies (e.g., 
Boyd, Hu, and Jagannathan (2005), Jagannathan and Wang (1996), Campbell (1996), Lustig and 
van Nieuwerburgh (2005, 2010)), which show that unemployment, income growth, and the 
housing collateral ratio capture relevant macroeconomic information.  
In our tests, we use an economic activity index (US Econ Act, State Econ Act) by 
combining the three macroeconomic variables.4 To construct the indices, we first standardize 
each macroeconomic variable to have zero sample mean and standard deviation equal to one. 
Then, we add the standardized values of income growth and hy, subtract the standardized value 
of relative unemployment, and divide the result by three to obtain the corresponding U.S. or 
state-level index. The Appendix provides further details on the data sources and method used to 
construct these state-quarter variables. 
Following earlier studies on U.S.-level liquidity (e.g., Chordia, Sarkar, and 
Subrahmanyam (2005), Sauer (2007)), we also control for national monetary policy and credit 
conditions using the term spread (ten-year government bond yield minus one-year government 
bond yield) and default spread (Baa-rated corporate bond yield minus ten-year government bond 
yield). These variables are based on quarterly data obtained from the Federal Reserve Board.  
Due to data constraints, our sample covers the 1980 to 2008 time period. State-level 
macroeconomic data are available from 1975 onward, but they are very noisy prior to 1980 due 
to various approximations. Further, the housing collateral series is unavailable after 2008. 
3.3 Local Funding Constraints, Opacity, Ownership, and Trading 
We use data from multiple sources to identify the channels through which local 
macroeconomic variables affect local stock liquidity. Specifically, we construct four state-quarter 
                                                 
4  The robustness analysis contained in the internet Appendix replicates our tests using the separate indicators that 
we use to construct the economic activity indices. See Internet Appendix Table A1. 
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indicator variables that capture: (i) funding constraints; (ii) state opacity; (iii) local institutional 
ownership; and (iv) local stock trading differentials between local and non-local institutions. 
These indicators are respectively set equal to one when, in the relevant quarter, the state is 
subject to funding constraints, the information environment of firms headquartered in the state is 
more opaque, local institutions hold larger fractions of local stocks, and local stock trading 
absolute differentials between local institutions and non-local ones are large. 
Specifically, we follow Hameed, Kang, and Viswanathan (2010) to construct the state 
funding constraint indicator, which is based on the portfolio returns of NYSE-listed investment 
banks and securities brokers and dealers (i.e., SIC = 6211) headquartered in the state. We follow 
Anderson, Duru, and Reeb (2009) to construct the opacity dummy, which is based on dollar 
volume, analyst following, and analyst forecast error.5 We also create a dummy variable that 
captures the degree of local institutional ownership each quarter based on the aggregate 
percentage ownership of 13(f) filers reporting a business address in the same state where the firm 
is headquartered. Finally, using the 13(f) data and stock prices from CRSP, we create a dummy 
variable that reflects the level of “trading” in local stocks by local institutions relative to non-
local institutions. The Appendix provides further details on the data sources and the method used 
to construct each of these four state-quarter indicator variables. 
3.4 Summary Statistics and Correlations 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics for the sample of state-quarter observations. The 
average State Amihud measure is −15.813 and is close to its median value of −15.843. The State 
Relative Spread has a mean of −4.664 and a median of −4.338. This evidence shows that the 
distribution of the natural logarithm of the state liquidity measures is roughly symmetric.  The 
                                                 
5 We use the state opacity dummy measured in quarter t − 1 in the baseline empirical tests to avoid any 
contemporaneous correlations between the state opacity dummy and the state liquidity measures. 
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liquidity measures are also quite persistent and, therefore, the standard errors of the coefficient 
estimates in our regression analysis are adjusted for serial autocorrelation. 
Table 2 reports the correlations among all the variables used in the main analysis, 
including the liquidity measures and the lagged local and U.S. macroeconomic variables. The 
table reports Pearson (Spearman-rank) correlations above (below) the main diagonal. As 
expected, the State Amihud and State Relative Spread measures are positively correlated. More 
importantly, the lagged state economic activity index is negatively correlated with current levels 
of both the State Amihud and State Relative Spread measures. This preliminary evidence 
supports our main conjecture that better local economic conditions are associated with higher 
liquidity (i.e., less illiquidity) of local stocks in the subsequent quarter.  
4. Local Economic Conditions and Local Liquidity 
In this section we present our main results for the relation between local liquidity and 
local economic conditions. We also report evidence from a variety of robustness tests based on 
different estimation methods, different subsamples, and different liquidity measures. 
4.1 Baseline Liquidity Regression Estimates 
We begin our empirical analysis by testing our first hypothesis. We use two different 
estimation methods to investigate the relation between local (i.e., state-level) economic 
conditions and the subsequent stock liquidity of local firms. The first approach pools data along 
both time and cross-sectional dimensions. In these regressions, the current state liquidity is the 
dependent variable and all economic activity measures are lagged as described earlier. All pooled 
regression specifications include state fixed effects, but we suppress their coefficient estimates to 
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conserve space. In addition to the panel estimation method, we estimate the relation between 
local economic conditions and local liquidity using the Fama and MacBeth (1973) method.  
Table 3 presents the regression estimates that use the state Amihud illiquidity or the state 
relative spread measure as the dependent variable. Columns (1) through (5) report the panel 
regression estimates and column (6) reports the Fama-MacBeth regression estimates.6 Consistent 
with our first main conjecture (H1), we find that the lagged state economic activity is 
significantly negatively related to current state illiquidity. When we control for state fixed effects 
alone, as shown in column (1), the coefficient estimate of the state economic activity index is -
0.677 (t-statistic = −10.31). This is very similar to its estimate in column (4) where we control 
for U.S. economic activity and monetary policy variables (estimate = −0.699, t-statistic = −7.98).  
The economic magnitude of the coefficient estimates is significant. For example, a one 
standard deviation increase in the local economic activity index (= 0.602) implies an average 
increase of 0.421 (= 0.602 × 0.699) in the Amihud illiquidity measure, which is equivalent to 
28.61% of the dependent variable’s standard deviation. The economic significance of the panel 
regression estimates is even higher when the state relative spread is the dependent variable. 
The evidence also shows that local factors explain substantially more variation in and 
have a larger impact on local liquidity than national factors.7 The estimates for the state Amihud 
illiquidity (relative spread) model in column (1) indicate that local economic conditions alone 
explain 10.4 (20.6) percent of the within-panel variation in local liquidity. Adding national 
macroeconomic and money supply variables to the specification increases the within-panel 
adjusted-R2 by only 5.7 (6.9) percent in column (4).  
                                                 
6 To conserve space, Table 3 only reports the estimates based on the US and state economic activity indices. For 
completeness, Table A1 in the Appendix reports coefficient estimates for the models using the individual 
components of the economic activity indices (i.e., income growth, relative unemployment, housing collateral), 
which are similar to the baseline results. 
7 We are grateful to Annette Vissing-Jorgensen for suggesting this discussion. 
 13 
 
Further, the economic magnitude of the effect of local economic conditions on local 
liquidity is larger than that of U.S. conditions. When the state economic activity index decreases 
by one standard deviation (= 0.602), the state Amihud illiquidity increases by 0.41 (0.602 × 
0.677) and the state relative spread increases by 0.60 (0.602 × 0.979). By contrast, the impact of 
a one standard deviation decrease in the U.S. economic activity index (= 0.583) is only 0.16 
(0.583 × 0.270) for the state Amihud illiquidity and 0.27 (0.583 × 0.466) for the state relative 
spread.  
Overall, consistent with the correlation estimates and our main hypothesis (H1), the 
baseline liquidity regression estimates in Table 3 show that better (worse) local economic 
conditions are followed by higher (lower) local stock liquidity.  
4.2 Different Estimation Methods 
The inferences from the baseline results are robust to changing the model specification or 
estimation technique. Most notably, in column (5) of Table 3, we include time fixed effects in 
the model specification in addition to state fixed effects, and drop all U.S.-level variables. This 
specification is very conservative as it accounts for all unobserved state-level constant factors as 
well as national time-varying factors. Consistent with the baseline results, the state-level 
economic activity index has a statistically significant, negative coefficient estimate. Specifically, 
the coefficient estimate of the state economic activity index is −0.153 (t-statistic = −2.30) for the 
state Amihud illiquidity model and −0.057 (t-statistic = −1.80) for the state relative spread 
model.  
We obtain similar results when we estimate cross-sectional Fama-MacBeth quarterly 
regressions, reported in column (6) of Table 3. Because U.S. national factors are constant in each 
quarterly cross-section, the only explanatory variable in the Fama-MacBeth regressions is the 
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state economic activity index. The table reports the time-series mean cross-sectional coefficients 
and their Newey-West (1987) corrected t-statistics. We find that the coefficient estimate of the 
index is negative and statistically significant for both the state Amihud illiquidity (estimate = 
−0.534, t-statistic = −13.95) and relative spread (estimate = −0.217, t-statistic = −16.13). 
4.3 Subperiods, Alternative Liquidity Measures, and Subsample of States 
The results from additional tests further indicate that our baseline results are robust. To 
conserve space, we briefly discuss these results here and report them in the Internet Appendix. 
First, to assess whether the relation between local economic conditions and local stock liquidity 
is robust over time, we divide our sample into six sub-periods. We find that the relation between 
local liquidity and local economic conditions goes in the same direction and is statistically 
significant at the 1% confidence level in each sub-period (see Internet Appendix Table A2). 
Second, we examine whether our key results are affected by the choice of liquidity 
measure. The results from these tests are reported in Internet Appendix Table A3. We find that 
our inferences hold when we use alternative measures such as the Corwin and Schultz (2012) 
spread measure, the Lesmond, Ogden, and Trzcinka (LOT) (1999) measure, and the turnover of 
local stocks. We also repeat our tests using industry-adjusted liquidity measures to ensure that 
the geographical clustering of industries does not drive our main results due to the known 
commonality in industry-level liquidity (e.g., Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2000)). The 
results from these tests are reported in Internet Appendix Table A4. 
Third, we examine whether the clustering of firms and investors across U.S. states affects 
our results. To this end, we repeat our baseline tests after excluding large states (California, New 
York, and Texas) and states with one large dominant firm (Arkansas, home of Walmart, and 
Washington, home of Microsoft) from our sample. The results reported in Internet Appendix 
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Table A5 indicate that imposing this restriction on our sample does not affect our previous 
inference.   
4.4 MSA and Regional Analysis 
Finally, we examine whether the choice of the geographical unit of observation affects 
our results. We begin by replicating our baseline analysis after restricting the definition of ‘local’ 
to Metropolitan Statistical Areas, as defined by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Due to data 
availability, this analysis is limited to a shorter period (i.e., 1990-2008) and uses annual 
observations. Notwithstanding these limitations, we expect that our inferences would hold, if the 
baseline results are due to a persistent local phenomenon. To compute the MSA annual Amihud 
and relative spread measures, we first compute for each firm in an MSA the yearly average of its 
Amihud and relative spread measures. Then, we compute a value weighted average at the MSA 
level of the annual firm-level measures.  
The results reported in Table 4 for the MSA-level tests continue to support our first 
hypothesis. Lagged MSA economic conditions predict the subsequent year MSA-level liquidity.8 
By contrast, when we redefine ‘local’ in terms of the four divisions of the U.S. Census Bureau, 
there is no significant relation between regional liquidity and lagged regional economic 
conditions. The results from the regional analysis are reported in Internet Appendix Table A6. 
Overall, these results suggest that the relation between economic variables and liquidity a local 
component in liquidity rather than a national component since regional economic conditions, 
which are arguably more related to the national business cycle as opposed to the business cycle 
of states or MSA’s, do not predict local liquidity. 
                                                 
8 In the Internet Appendix Table A7, we show that the MSA economic conditions predict liquidity even when we 
use the Corwin and Schultz (2012) spread measure, the Lesmond, Ogden, and Trzcinka (LOT) (1999) measure, and 
the turnover of local stocks. 
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5. Additional Results 
 Our baseline evidence shows that local liquidity varies directly with local economic 
conditions. In this section, we test auxiliary predictions of our main hypothesis to ensure that the 
documented link between state-level liquidity and economic conditions is not spurious or simply 
a reflection of a different mechanism that affects both liquidity and local economic conditions.  
5.1 Local Economic Conditions and Firm Localness  
Our first hypothesis suggests that the relation between local economic conditions and 
local stock liquidity should depend on the degree of firm localness. Specifically, the link between 
local stock liquidity and economic conditions should be stronger for firms whose returns are 
more sensitive to local shocks or whose investor base is more local. To test this conjecture, we 
classify firms based on size or affiliation to the S&P 500 index and replicate our analysis for the 
segmented samples of stocks. We expect that the link between stock liquidity and local economic 
conditions would be weaker for firms that are less local, i.e., larger or S&P 500 firms. 
We test this auxiliary hypothesis in Table 5. In Panel A, we form two local stock 
portfolios for each state based on whether the firm market capitalization is above or below the 
NYSE median as of the previous quarter-end. We classify the corresponding portfolios as Large 
and Small, respectively. Similarly, in Panel B we form two local stock portfolios for each state 
based on whether the firm is included in the S&P 500 index as of the previous quarter-end. Then, 
we replicate our baseline analysis for each set of state portfolios. 
The evidence in Table 5 is consistent with the prediction that stock liquidity depends 
more strongly on local economic conditions for firms that are more local. In particular, the 
evidence in Panel A indicates that the effect of local economic condition on stock liquidity is 
larger among Small firms than Large firms. This holds whether we focus on the state Amihud 
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illiquidity or relative spread measure. Similarly, in Panel B, we find that the effect of local 
economic conditions on liquidity is larger among Non-S&P 500 stocks than S&P 500 firms.  
5.2 Local Economic Conditions and Exogenous Variation in Liquidity 
 To further examine the link between local liquidity and economic conditions, we exploit 
exogenous variation in liquidity that is unrelated to other phenomena that might cause a spurious 
correlation between liquidity and the local economy. Specifically, we build on the finding in 
Loughran and Schultz (2005) that liquidity is scarcer in rural regions. Also, we exploit the 
introduction of decimalization on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) between August of 
2000 and January of 2001, which has increased the liquidity of all stocks (e.g., Bessembinder 
(2003), Chakravarty, Wood, and Van Ness (2004)).  
Our conjecture is that when liquidity is on average lower (i.e., in rural areas and/or prior 
to decimalization), the trading activity of a small group of investors would have a stronger 
impact on the liquidity of local stocks. This conjecture implies that local economic conditions 
would have a stronger effect on stock liquidity in rural states and prior to decimalization.  
 We test this auxiliary hypothesis in Table 6, where we expand the baseline model to 
include indicator variables that reflect the state-level degree of rural population and the advent of 
decimalization. The rural dummy is based on Census data and takes the value of one when the 
percentage of state population living in rural areas is above the median rate during the year. The 
pre-decimalization dummy is equal to one for years up to 2001. We also include interactions of 
these dummy variables with the state-economic activity index. The interaction terms measure the 
incremental effect of state economic conditions on the liquidity of firms in rural states and before 
the decimalization event. We expect these interaction terms to be negatively related to state 
Amihud illiquidity and relative spreads. 
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 The evidence in Table 6 is consistent with our predictions. The coefficient estimates on 
the rural and pre-decimalization dummy variables are positive. Thus, firms in rural states have 
lower liquidity and liquidity was lower prior to decimalization. Most importantly, the coefficient 
on the interaction term of the rural dummy with the local economic activity index is negative and 
statistically significant. Therefore, the liquidity of rural stocks, which is on average lower, is also 
more sensitive to local economic conditions. 
 The coefficient on the interaction between pre-decimalization and local economic activity 
is not statistically significant, which suggests that decimalization did not on average affect the 
link between local economic conditions and liquidity. However, decimalization had a strong 
impact on firms in rural states. Specifically, in regressions (3) and (6), we include three terms:  
two double interactions (State Econ × Rural, State Econ × PreDecimal) and a triple interaction 
term (State Econ × Rural × PreDecimal). The triple interaction term takes on a negative and 
statistically significant estimate, suggesting that decimalization did in fact affect the link between 
local economic conditions and liquidity in rural states, where liquidity is scarcer to begin with. 
5.3 Impact of Firm Size, Stock Returns, and Lagged Liquidity  
Next, we modify our baseline regression specification to ensure that the significance of 
local economic conditions is not driven by the serial autocorrelation in the liquidity measures or 
the relation between liquidity and returns as well as liquidity and firm size.  We report the results 
for these augmented specifications in Table 7.  
As shown in columns (1), (4), (5) and (8), lagged liquidity is indeed a significant 
predictor of current liquidity. However, even after controlling for lagged liquidity, the lagged 
state economic activity index is statistically significant. For example, in the Amihud illiquidity 
model (see column (1)), the estimate on the state economic activity index is −0.048 (t-statistic = 
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−2.72). Similarly, in the relative spread model (see column (5)), the estimate on the state 
economic activity index is −0.016 (t-statistic = −2.18). 
Several previous studies find that liquidity deteriorates when returns are low (e.g., 
Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2001), Chordia, Sarkar, and Subrahmanyam (2005), and 
Hameed, Kang, and Viswanathan (2010)), and Korniotis and Kumar (2013) show that local 
economic conditions predict future returns. To ensure that our baseline estimates are not 
somehow mechanically induced, we add the past, contemporaneous, and future returns of the 
firms headquartered in the state as additional control variables. As expected, the value-weighted 
returns of local firms are significantly related to state liquidity. However, even after controlling 
for stock returns of local firms, the local economic activity index remains significant. For 
example, in the Amihud illiquidity model (see column (2)), the estimate on the state economic 
activity index is −0.143 (t-statistic = −2.16). Similarly, in the relative spread model (see column 
(6)), the estimate on the state economic activity index is −0.053 (t-statistic = −2.07). 
Firm size is also known to be related to liquidity with large firms typically experiencing 
more ample liquidity. If deteriorating local conditions lead to excess selling of local stocks, the 
prices and thus market capitalization of local firms will decrease, causing local liquidity to 
decrease. To ensure that the relation between local economic conditions and local liquidity is not 
just a manifestation of the size-liquidity phenomenon, we add a size control variable in our 
regressions. The size index is the average market size of all firms headquartered in a state. As 
expected, the state size index is negatively correlated to the Amihud illiquidity measure (see 
regressions (3) and (4)) and the relative spread (see regressions (7) and (8)). However, despite 
the strong relation between size and liquidity, the state economic activity index remains a 
statistically significant predictor of state illiquidity in the presence of the size controls. 
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Overall, the estimates from the augmented regression models show that the significance 
of the state economic activity index is not due to autocorrelation biases. Our results also do not 
merely reflect the previously documented relation between liquidity and returns and liquidity and 
firm size. 9 
6. Amplification Role of Local Capital Markets  
In this section, we test our second hypothesis (H2) to assess the potential channels 
through which local economic conditions affect the liquidity of local stocks. For this analysis, we 
augment our baseline liquidity regression model by including characteristics of the local capital 
market environment and their interactions with the local economic activity index.  
As previously described, we first classify state-quarters based on the tightness of funding 
constraints faced by local investors, the opacity of the information environment of local firms, 
the ownership levels of local institutions, and the difference in the trading intensity of local and 
non-local institutions in local stocks. Then, we add the corresponding indicator variables and 
their interactions with the state economic activity indices to our baseline liquidity regression 
specifications to test whether local capital market conditions affect the level of local liquidity and 
its relation with local economic conditions.  
Table 8 reports the results of our tests of the second hypothesis. The regression estimates 
indicate that in the single-interaction-term specifications (see columns (1) through (4)), all 
coefficient estimates are consistent with our second set of predictions (H2). In particular, as 
shown in column (1), both the positive coefficient estimates of State Fund Constraint (SF) as 
well as the negative coefficient estimates of State Econ Act × SF interaction variable are 
                                                 
9 For completeness, in the Internet Appendix, we estimate all our baseline regressions with the additional controls, 
i.e., lagged illiquidity, state market capitalization, and state return indices. See Tables A8 to A10. In all cases, we 
find that the state-economic activity index is a statistically significant predictor of liquidity in the presence of these 
additional control variables. 
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statistically significant. Consistent with the notion that binding local funding constraints restrict 
the proportion of liquidity providers for local stocks, these estimates imply that the liquidity of 
local stocks is lower in state-quarters characterized by binding funding constraints and that this 
effect is amplified during local economic downturns.  
Similarly, in column (2), the positive coefficient estimates of State Opacity (SO) and the 
negative coefficient estimates of State Econ Act × SO interaction are statistically significant. 
Hence, consistent with our conjecture that liquidity suppliers demand higher compensation when 
adverse selection is more severe, the liquidity of local stocks is lower in state-quarters 
characterized by high opacity and this effect is amplified during local economic downturns. 
The next two models in Table 8 focus on the impact of local ownership and trading 
intensity on local liquidity. The coefficient estimate of State Local IO (SL) is positive, while that 
of the State Econ Act × SL interaction variable is negative, and both are statistically significant 
(see column (3)). This evidence supports the conjecture that local investors are more likely to 
behave as the informed liquidity demanders of the VW2012 model and, as a result, higher local 
holdings would result in lower local stock liquidity and a stronger relation between local 
economic conditions and local liquidity.  
In column (4), only the negative coefficient estimate of State Econ Act × State Rel Local 
Trade (SR) interaction variable is statistically significant. Therefore, in state-quarters that are 
characterized by average economic conditions, large differences between local and non-local 
investors in the trading of local stocks do not affect local stock liquidity. However, consistent 
with the idea that local investors would demand greater liquidity during economic downturns, the 
relation between local economic conditions and local liquidity is indeed stronger in state-quarters 
that are characterized by high relative local trading.  
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In the full model specification (see column (5)), we find that the coefficient estimates of 
three of the four interaction terms become marginally significant. The full specification results, 
however, should be interpreted with caution because the sample size is significantly smaller due 
to the lack of availability of the funding constraint data before 1993 and the limited presence of 
NYSE-listed broker-dealers across the U.S. In model (6), we drop the funding constraint 
indicator from the specification to relax this severe data constraint. The more parsimonious 
specification estimated for the larger sample again supports our second hypothesis (H2).  
Overall, the evidence in Table 8 indicates that market segmentation created by local 
investors’ preference for local stocks can largely explain the relation between local liquidity and 
local economic conditions. Supporting our second hypothesis, these results imply that local 
capital market conditions affect the liquidity of local stocks both directly and through their 
impact on the relation between local economic conditions and subsequent local stock liquidity. 
7. Summary and Conclusion  
Understanding the determinants of stock liquidity is important because it has direct 
implications for investors’ ability to diversify volatility and liquidity shocks. Motivated by the 
recent literature on the geographical segmentation of U.S. capital markets and the evidence on 
localized trading, we posit that state-level economic conditions would affect the subsequent 
liquidity levels of local stocks.  
Consistent with this conjecture, we show that the location of a firm affects its stock 
liquidity. Specifically, there is an economically significant local component in stock liquidity 
that varies with local economic conditions. The liquidity of firms headquartered in a U.S. state is 
systematically higher (lower) when the local economy performs well (poorly). Further, the 
impact of local economic conditions on local stock liquidity is stronger when local funding 
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constraints are more binding, the local information environment is more opaque, local 
institutions hold larger stakes in local stocks, and there are larger differences in trading of local 
stocks between local and non-local investors.  
Unlike most of the evidence in the existing literature, our findings demonstrate that real 
macroeconomic conditions do affect liquidity. In particular, the business conditions that seem to 
matter most are the local economic conditions. This is an intuitive finding, because the state of 
the local economy is more salient to local investors than the state of the national economy. Much 
like blizzards in the locale of a firm affect its liquidity (Loughran and Schultz (2004)), a 
deteriorating local economy can make local investors more risk averse and more pessimistic, 
which lowers the liquidity of local firms that they invest and trade in. 
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Table 1 – Summary Statistics. 
This table reports summary statistics for all the variables used in the analysis, covering the period from 1980 to 2008. See Appendix for details on definitions of variables. 
 
Variable Mean SD 5th Pctl 25th Pctl Median 75th Pctl 95th Pctl Auto- Correl. 
(1) State Amihud Illiquidity -15.813 1.471 -18.122 -16.805 -15.843 -14.929 -13.279 0.628 
(2) State Relative Spread -4.664 1.169 -6.958 -5.259 -4.338 -3.871 -3.163 0.900 
(3) Metro Area Amihud Illiquidity -14.820 2.326 -18.748 -16.237 -14.844 -13.273 -11.144 0.568 
(4) Metro Area Relative Spread -4.264 1.222 -6.677 -4.847 -4.074 -3.443 -2.551 0.710 
(5) State Economic Activity Index 0.000 0.602 -0.872 -0.342 -0.044 0.298 0.958 0.443 
(6) Metro Area Economic Activity Index 0.000 0.470 -0.614 -0.162 0.105 0.357 0.791 0.265 
(7) U.S. Economic Activity Index 0.000 0.583 -1.028 -0.448 0.075 0.459 0.856 0.826 
(8) Term Spread 0.000 1.000 -1.366 -0.759 -0.044 0.680 1.631 0.861 
(9) Default Spread 0.000 1.000 -1.068 -0.719 -0.234 0.466 1.746 0.695 
(10) State Quarterly Stock Return 0.029 0.115 -0.168 -0.030 0.033 0.094 0.206 0.010 
(11) State Market Capitalization 18.823 0.884 17.337 18.291 18.808 19.422 20.207 0.954 
(12) State Funding Constraint 0.536 0.499 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.021 
(13) State Opacity 0.499 0.500 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.700 
(14) State Local Institutional Ownership 0.500 0.500 0.000 0.000 0.500 1.000 1.000 0.741 
(15) State Local minus Non-Local Trading 0.397 0.489 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.055 
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Table 2 – Correlation Matrix for Key Variables. 
The table reports pairwise Pearson (upper diagonal) and Spearman (rank) (lower diagonal) correlations for the main variables used in the empirical analysis. Both State 
Amihud and State Relative Spread are measured in quarter t, while all real macroeconomic variables are measured in quarter t − 1. Other U.S.-level variables (i.e., term 
spread and default spread) are measured in quarter t – 1. The sample period is from 1980 to 2008. a, b, and c denote correlation coefficients that are significantly different 
from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. See Appendix for details on definitions of variables. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
(1) State Amihud Illiquidity 0.662a -0.292a -0.073a 0.126a -0.088a -0.013 -0.392a 
(2) State Relative Spread 0.672a -0.416a -0.196a 0.061a -0.144a 0.036a -0.670a 
(3) State Econ Act -0.268a -0.341a 0.467a -0.277a -0.192a -0.057a 0.365a 
(4) US Econ Act -0.071a -0.084a 0.476a -0.147a -0.277a 0.002 0.239a 
(5) Term Spread 0.148a 0.048a -0.317a -0.229a 0.318a 0.029b 0.036a 
(6) Default Spread -0.108a -0.152a -0.200a -0.218a 0.335a -0.020 0.023c 
(7) State Quarterly Return -0.012 0.022 -0.047a 0.010 0.030b -0.040a -0.121a 
(8) State Market Capitalization -0.362a -0.672a 0.357a 0.227a -0.004 0.032b -0.105a 
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Table 3 – Relation between State Quarterly Aggregate Stock Liquidity and Past Economic 
Activity: Panel and Fama-MacBeth (1977) Estimates. 
The table reports predictive linear regression estimates for the relation between the aggregate quarterly liquidity 
of stocks headquartered in the state and state-level real economic conditions. The dependent variable is one of 
the state-quarter liquidity measures, State Amihud Illiquidity or State Relative Spread. The main independent 
variables are State Econ Act, US Econ Act, Term Spread, and Default Spread. State Amihud Illiquidity and State 
Relative Spread are measured in quarter t, while all predictors are measured in quarter t − 1. Columns (1) to (5) 
report panel regression coefficient estimates and t-statistics. All panel specifications include state fixed effects, 
State FE, and specification (5) also includes calendar quarter fixed effects, Qtr FE. Robust t-statistics in 
parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. The fit measure is the within-panel 
adjusted-R2. Columns (6) reports time-series mean coefficients of Fama-MacBeth (1977) quarterly state-level 
cross-sectional regressions. Newey-West (1987) corrected t-statistics are in parentheses. The fit measure is the 
average cross-sectional adjusted-R2.  
 
  Panel Estimation   FM 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
State Amihud Illiquidity 
State Econ Act -0.677 -0.699 -0.153 -0.534 
(-10.31) (-7.98) (-2.30) (-13.95) 
US Econ Act -0.270 -0.070 
(-5.94) (-0.97) 
Term Spread 0.226 0.150 
(6.20) (4.48) 
Default Spread -0.224 -0.324 
  (-7.20) (-8.69) 
N [Avg N] 5,747 5,747 5,747 5,747 5,747 [49] 
Adj R2 [Avg Adj R2] 10.4% 1.9% 5.0% 16.1% 48.0% [2.6%] 
State Relative Spread 
State Econ Act -0.979 -1.104 -0.057 -0.217 
(-15.44) (-12.93) (-1.80) (-16.13) 
US Econ Act -0.466 -0.146 
(-22.09) (-2.00) 
Term Spread 0.176 -0.119 
(14.81) (-5.40) 
Default Spread -0.258 -0.318 
  (-17.48) (-12.34) 
N [Avg N] 5,090 5,090 5,090 5,090 5,090 [48] 
Adj R2 [Avg Adj R2] 20.6% 4.7% 3.7% 27.5% 88.4% [4.0%] 
Qtr FE No No No No Yes NA 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes NA 
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Table 4 – Relation between MSA Aggregate Annual Stock Liquidity and Economic Activity: 
Panel and Fama-MacBeth (1977) Estimates.  
The table reports predictive linear regression estimates for the relation between the aggregate annual liquidity of 
stocks headquartered in the metro statistical area (MSA) and MSA-level real economic conditions. The 
dependent variable is one of the state-year liquidity measures, State Amihud Illiquidity or State Relative Spread. 
The annual measures are based on average daily Amihud and Rel Spread within one year to come at annual 
measures;The main independent variables are State Econ Act, US Econ Act, Term Spread, and Default Spread. 
State Amihud Illiquidity and State Relative Spread are measured in year t, while all predictors are measured in 
year t − 1. Columns (1) to (5) report panel regression coefficient estimates and t-statistics. All panel 
specifications include state fixed effects, State FE, and specification (5) also includes calendar year fixed 
effects, Year FE. Robust t-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. The 
fit measure is the within-panel adjusted-R2. Columns (6) reports time-series mean coefficients of Fama-
MacBeth (1977) annual state-level cross-sectional regressions. Newey-West (1987) corrected t-statistics are in 
parentheses. The fit measure is the average cross-sectional adjusted-R2.  
 
  Panel Estimation   FM 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
MSA Amihud Illiquidity 
MSA Econ Act -0.742 -0.323 -0.243 -0.326 
(-7.95) (-3.74) (-2.86) (-2.45) 
US Econ Act -0.459 -1.656 0.556 
(-11.37) (-19.80) (3.03) 
Term Spread 0.225 -0.094 -0.060 
(9.49) (-3.53) (-1.10) 
Default Spread -0.150 -0.263 -0.505 
  (-6.65) (-7.40) (-11.95) 
N [Avg N] 4,793 7,170 7,170 4,793 4,793 [208] 
Adj R2 [Avg Adj R2] 3.6% 2.6% 1.8% 22.9% 37.8% [8.1%] 
MSA Relative Spread 
MSA Econ Act -0.414 -0.186 -0.154 -0.195 
(-5.96) (-2.64) (-2.13) (-2.74) 
US Econ Act -0.605 -1.583 0.544 
(-29.18) (-45.58) (5.18) 
Term Spread 0.147 -0.190 -0.052 
(13.43) (-14.90) (-2.07) 
Default Spread -0.164 -0.229 -0.473 
  (-14.23) (-16.15) (-25.64) 
N [Avg N] 4,753 6,339 6,339 4,753 4,753 [207] 
Adj R2 [Avg Adj R2] 2.6% 8.7% 2.3% 42.3% 79.3% [9.8%] 
Year FE No No No No Yes NA 
MSA FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes NA 
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Table 5 – Panel Estimates of the Relation between State Quarterly Liquidity and Economic 
Activity by Firm Localness. 
The table reports panel regression estimates for the relation between the aggregate quarterly liquidity of stocks 
headquartered in the state and state-level real economic conditions when we segment firms by localness. In 
Panel A, we segment firms using their equity market capitalization as of the previous quarter-end. Small (Large) 
portfolios include firms whose equity market capitalization is below (above) the NYSE median. In Panel B, we 
segment firms by whether they are part of the S&P 500 index. The dependent variable is one of the state-quarter 
liquidity measures, State Amihud Illiquidity or State Relative Spread. The main independent variables are State 
Econ Act, US Econ Act, Term Spread, and Default Spread. State Amihud Illiquidity and State Relative Spread 
are measured in quarter t, while all predictors are measured in quarter t − 1. Columns (1) to (5) report panel 
regression coefficient estimates and t-statistics. All panel specifications include state fixed effects, State FE, and 
specification (5) also includes calendar quarter fixed effects, Qtr FE. Robust t-statistics in parentheses are 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. The fit measure is the within-panel adjusted-R2. The p-
values for the test of difference in coefficients between groups are in square brackets. 
 
Panel A – Firm Localness based on Size.  
 Small Large 
P-value 
Difference  Small Large 
P-value 
Difference 
State Amihud Illiquidity State Relative Spread 
State Econ Act -0.781 -0.667 [0.06] -0.945 -0.847 [0.08] 
(-8.26) (-7.91) (-10.38) (-9.27) 
US Econ Act -0.259 -0.379 [0.01] -0.407 -0.583 [0.00] 
(-4.87) (-5.00) (-9.02) (-8.16) 
Term Spread 0.130 -0.264 [0.00] -0.063   -0.269 [0.00] 
(6.01) (-6.97) (-4.21) (-10.86) 
Default Spread -0.297 -0.351 [0.21]   -0.371   -0.287 [0.00] 
(-10.11) (-6.85) (-18.79) (-10.25) 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 5,723 5,002 5,059 4,070 
Adj R2 26.7% 29.3% 32.8% 33.2% 
 
Panel B – Firm Localness based on S&P500 Affiliation 
 Non-S&P500 S&P500
P-value 
Difference  Non-S&P500 S&P500 
P-value 
Difference 
State Amihud Illiquidity State Relative Spread 
State Econ Act -0.921 -0.766 [0.02] -0.947 -0.825 [0.04] 
(-8.56) (-6.63) (-8.74) (-7.81) 
US Econ Act -0.333 -0.202 [0.00] -0.344 -0.833 [0.00] 
(-3.76) (-2.85) (-6.23) (-7.39) 
Term Spread 0.158 -0.297 [0.00] -0.074 -0.336 [0.00] 
(4.86) (-8.22) (-4.16) (-8.34) 
Default Spread -0.305   -0.240 [0.17] -0.361 -0.289 [0.01] 
(-7.94) (-4.42) (-14.80) (-7.23) 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 5,736 4,444 5,083 3,096 
Adj R2 24.6% 30.0% 31.1% 36.9% 
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Table 6 – Panel Estimates of the Relation between State Quarterly Liquidity and Economic 
Activity Controlling for Exogenous Variation in Liquidity: Urban vs. Rural and Post-
Decimalization.  
The table reports expanded predictive panel linear regression estimates. The dependent variable is one of the 
state-quarter liquidity measures, State Amihud Illiquidity or State Relative Spread. The main independent 
variables are lagged State Econ Act, US Econ Act, Term Spread, and Default Spread. All panel specifications 
include state fixed effects, State FE. The additional control variables are based on two dummy variables. The 
first one is the rural dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for states where the percentage of state population 
living in rural areas above the median percentage across all states. The second one is the PreDecimal dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 for all quarters before 2001. The PreDecimal variable captures the period 
before the implementation of decimal trading. Robust t-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. The fit measure is the within-panel adjusted-R2. Newey-West (1987) 
corrected t-statistics are in parentheses.   
 
State Amihud Illiquidity State Relative Spread 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
Rural Dummy 0.531 0.474 0.394 0.222 0.213 0.293 
(15.65) (14.06) (5.60) (15.56) (15.05) (9.90) 
PreDecimal Dummy 0.039 1.012 
(0.18) (10.55) 
Rural×PreDecimal 0.068 0.042 
(0.85) (1.34) 
State Econ Act -0.308 -0.177 -0.269 -0.165 -0.123 -0.130 
(-9.74) (-5.74) (-5.50) (-12.18) (-9.09) (-6.34) 
State Econ×Rural -0.721 -0.347 -0.252 -0.325 
(-12.22) (-2.86) (-9.73) (-6.11) 
State Econ×PreDecimal 0.078 0.034 
(1.28) (1.24) 
State Econ×Rural×PreDecimal -0.544 -0.260 
(-3.88) (-1.71) 
US Econ Act 0.101 0.117 0.111 -0.072 -0.067 -0.114 
(1.12) (1.30) (1.23) (-1.98) (-1.85) (-3.18) 
Term Spread -0.024 -0.043 -0.039 -0.114 -0.119 -0.009 
(-0.48) (-0.88) (-0.78) (-4.18) (-4.41) (-0.32) 
Default Spread 0.046 0.033 0.031 0.007 0.005 0.020 
(1.07) (0.76) (0.72) (0.34) (0.24) (0.92) 
State FE Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
N 5,747 5,747 5,747 5,090 5,090 5,090 
Adj R2 32.3% 33.8% 33.9%   83.0% 83.2% 83.7% 
 
  
 35 
 
Table 7 – Relation between State Quarterly Liquidity and Economic Activity Controlling for 
State Portfolio Firm Size, Stock Returns, and Lagged Liquidity. 
The table reports expanded predictive panel linear regression estimates. The dependent variable is one of the 
state-quarter liquidity measures, State Amihud Illiquidity or State Relative Spread. The main independent 
variables are lagged State Econ Act, US Econ Act, Term Spread, and Default Spread. All panel specifications 
include state fixed effects, State FE. The additional control variables are the lagged liquidity measure and 
lagged mean market capitalization of the state portfolio, as well as its lagged, contemporaneous, and one-
quarter-ahead value-weighted stock return. Robust t-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity 
and serial correlation. The fit measure is the within-panel adjusted-R2. Newey-West (1987) corrected t-statistics 
are in parentheses.   
 
State Amihud Illiquidity State Relative Spread 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
State Amihudt-1 0.787 0.686  
(39.36) (21.96)  
State Relative Spreadt-1  0.833 0.814 
 (35.57) (31.09) 
State Return Indext-1 -0.638 -0.811 -0.580 -0.277 
(-4.46) (-8.78) (-8.66) (-11.06) 
State Return Indext -1.152 -1.054 -0.538 -0.559 
(-8.03) (-13.69) (-9.85) (-16.13) 
State Return Indext+1 0.621 0.289 0.169 0.200 
(5.32) (4.00) (3.01) (5.13) 
State Market Cap   -1.337 -0.427    -0.236 -0.045 
  (-18.08) (-9.50)    (-3.65) (-2.74) 
State Econ Act -0.048 -0.143 -0.048 -0.037 -0.016 -0.053 -0.042 -0.009 
(-2.72) (-2.16) (-1.98) (-2.04) (-2.18) (-2.07) (-2.05) (-2.00) 
US Econ Act 0.070 0.126 0.030 0.057 -0.012 -0.034 -0.099 0.008 
(1.94) (3.12) (0.93) (1.59) (-0.81) (-2.05) (-6.50) (0.51) 
Term Spread 0.024 0.048 0.040 0.055 0.001 -0.122 -0.098 -0.020 
(1.36) (2.08) (2.55) (2.75) (0.11) (-8.05) (-6.86) (-1.49) 
Default Spread -0.082 0.082 -0.013 -0.047 0.028 0.010 0.005 0.020 
(-5.55) (4.45) (-1.00) (-2.88) (3.86) (1.25) (0.52) (3.10) 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 5,741 5,653 5,647 5,647 5,041 5,040 4,991 4,991 
Adj R2 78.3% 51.0% 64.1% 81.2% 95.7% 89.3% 88.9% 96.2% 
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Table 8 – Relation between State Quarterly Liquidity and Economic Activity, Conditional on 
Local Capital Market Conditions. 
The table reports predictive linear regression estimates for the relation between the aggregate liquidity of stocks 
headquartered in the state and state-level real economic conditions, conditional on state-level funding 
constraints, information environment opacity, and local institutional ownership and relative trading. The 
dependent variable is one of the state-quarter liquidity measures, State Amihud Illiquidity or State Relative 
Spread. In addition to State Econ Act, US Econ Act, Term Spread, and Default Spread, the main independent 
variables also comprise State Fund Constraint (SF), State Opacity (SO), State Local IO (SL), and State Rel 
Local Trade (SR). The latter four variables are state-quarter indicators. State Amihud Illiquidity and State 
Relative Spread are measured in quarter t, while all real macroeconomic predictors are measured in quarter t − 
1. Other US-level predictors (i.e., term spread and default spread) are measured in quarter t – 1. State Fund 
Const, Local IO, and Rel Local Trading are measured in quarter t, while the State Opac is measured in quarter t 
− 1. Columns (1-6) report panel regression coefficient estimates and t-statistics. All panel specifications include 
state fixed effects, State FE. Robust t-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation. The fit measure is the within-panel adjusted-R2. See Appendix for further details on definitions of 
variables. 
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Table 8 – continued… 
  Panel Estimates   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
State Amihud Illiquidity 
State Econ Act 0.003 -0.069 0.008 0.016 0.064 0.109 
(0.01) (-0.57) (0.07) (0.16) (0.41) (0.94) 
State Fund Constraint (SF) 0.182 0.081 
(2.42) (1.31) 
State Opacity (SO) 0.417 0.588 0.242 
(3.00) (4.00) (1.78) 
State Local IO (SL) 0.390 0.211 0.470 
(3.22) (1.51) (4.45) 
State Rel Local Trade (SR)  -0.056 -0.063 -0.071 
(-1.11) (-1.87) (-1.47) 
State Econ Act×SF -0.477 -0.202 
(-8.73) (-3.03) 
State Econ Act×SO -0.400 -0.145 -0.035 
(-2.72) (-1.18) (-0.24) 
State Econ Act×SL -0.563 -0.236 -0.567 
(-5.37) (-1.43) (-4.06) 
State Econ Act×SR -0.628 -0.166 -0.513 
  (-5.50) (-1.60) (-4.37) 
N [Avg N] 1,053 4,502 5,747 5,703 949 4,502 
Adj R2 [Avg R2] 18.9% 19.2% 13.8% 11.3% 37.7% 23.7% 
  State Relative Spread 
State Econ Act 0.321 0.101 0.256 0.217 0.240 0.329 
(1.09) (0.76) (1.53) (1.49) (1.21) (1.37) 
State Fund Constraint (SF) 0.404 0.182 
(4.00) (3.49) 
State Opacity (SO) 1.254 1.645 1.046 
(8.43) (11.80) (7.31) 
State Local IO (SL) 0.779 0.207 0.516 
(5.01) (1.31) (5.35) 
State Rel Local Trade (SR)  -0.020 0.078 0.010 
(-0.32) (1.10) (0.24) 
State Econ Act×SF -0.798 -0.205 
(-4.37) (-2.07) 
State Econ Act×SO -0.554 -0.294 -0.093 
(-2.76) (-1.49) (-0.69) 
State Econ Act×SL -1.035 -0.344 -0.730 
(-6.38) (-2.06) (-5.22) 
State Econ Act×SR -0.988 -0.127 -0.639 
  (-6.34) (-1.89) (-4.90) 
N [Avg N] 1,025 4,472 5,090 5,090 949 4,472 
Adj R2 [Avg R2] 19.9% 42.6% 25.3% 15.3% 67.7% 48.9% 
US Econ Act Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
US Econ Act×Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Term & Default Spreads Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
APPENDIX 
Definition of Variables 
Variable 
Short 
Name 
Definition Data Source 
State (Metro Statistical 
Area) Amihud 
Illiquidity  
State 
(MSA) 
Amihud 
Natural logarithm of the value-weighted state portfolio Amihud liquidity 
measure of firms headquartered in the state (MSA). A firm Amihud 
liquidity measure is the quarterly mean daily ratio of its absolute stock 
return to its dollar volume.  
CRSP 
State (Metro Statistical 
Area) Portfolio 
Relative Spread 
State 
(MSA) 
Relative 
Spread 
Natural logarithm of the value-weighted state portfolio relative spread of 
firms headquartered in the state (MSA). The firm relative spread is the 
quarterly mean difference between its daily closing ask and bid prices 
divided by the midpoint of the bid-ask spread.  
CRSP 
State (Metro Statistical 
Area) Income Growth 
State 
(MSA)  
Inc Gr 
State-level (MSA-level) labor income quarterly growth. 
Bureau of 
Economic Analysis 
(BEA) 
State (Metro Statistical 
Area) Relative 
Unemployment 
State 
(MSA)  
Rel 
Unemp 
It is the ratio of current quarter state (MSA) unemployment rate to the 
moving average over the prior16 quarters. 
Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (BLS) 
State Housing 
Collateral Ratio 
State  
Hy 
Computed using the Lustig and van Nieuwerburgh (2005) method using 
state-level data.   
Metro Statistical Area 
Housing Price Growth 
State  
Hy Growth in price index of residential real estate in the MSA. 
Federal Housing 
Finance Agency 
(FHFA) 
State (Metro Statistical 
Area) Economic 
Activity Index 
State 
(MSA) 
Econ Act 
Computed for each state-quarter (MSA-quarter) by adding the standardized 
values of state (MSA) income growth and hy, and subtracting the 
standardized value of relative unemployment, and dividing by three. 
  
US Income Growth US Inc Gr US labor income quarterly growth. 
Bureau of 
Economic Analysis 
(BEA) 
US Relative 
Unemployment 
US Rel 
Unemp 
It is the ratio of current quarter US unemployment rate to the moving 
average over the prior16 quarters. 
Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (BLS) 
US Housing Collateral 
Ratio US hy From Stijn van Nieuwerburgh’s web site.   
US Economic Activity 
Index 
US Econ 
Act 
Computed for each quarter by adding the standardized values of U.S. 
income growth and hy, and subtracting the standardized value of U.S. 
relative unemployment, and dividing all by three. 
  
Ten-Year - One-Year 
Gov Bond 
Term 
Spread 
Ten-year government bond yield minus one-year government bond yield, 
from Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.  Fed 
Baa Corp Bond - One-
Year Gov Bond 
Default 
Spread 
Baa-rated corporate bond yield minus ten-year government bond yield, 
from Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Fed 
State Quarterly Stock 
Return 
State 
Return 
Index 
The value-weighted portfolio quarterly return of firms headquartered in the 
state.  CRSP 
State Market 
Capitalization 
State 
Market 
Cap 
Mean of log market capitalization of firms headquartered in the state at 
previous quarter-end. CRSP 
State Funding 
Constraint  
State 
Fund 
Const  
First, we compute value weights daily returns of portfolio of stocks 
headquartered in the state that have SIC code equal to 6211 (investment 
banks; securities brokers and dealers) and listed on NYSE. Then, we 
compute the residuals from a one-factor market model regression of this 
portfolio returns. The state funding constraint indicator is equal to 1 when 
the state mean daily residual is negative (capital constrained) and 0 
(unconstrained) otherwise. 
CRSP 
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Variable 
Short 
Name 
Definition Data Source 
State Opacity  State Opac  
Each quarter, we sort stocks into deciles by dollar volume (high to low), 
analyst following (high to low), and analyst forecast error (low to high). 
Volume is the quarterly aggregate dollar volume. Analyst following is the 
number of analysts following the firm in the quarter. Analyst forecast error 
is the absolute difference between the mean analysts’ earnings forecast and 
the actual firm earnings in the quarter divided by the firm’s stock price. We 
cumulate the three rankings and compute the value-weighted mean of the 
cumulative ranking for each state-quarter. The state opacity indicator is 
equal to 1 when the state ranking is above the sample median during the 
quarter and 0 otherwise. Among the individual components of the state 
opacity measure, dollar volume is the daily dollar volume aggregated 
within the quarter using data from the CRSP database. Analyst following is 
the number of analysts following the firm within the quarter. Analyst 
forecast error is the absolute difference between the mean analysts’ 
earnings forecast and the actual firm earnings within the quarter divided by 
the firm’s stock price. Both the analyst following and analyst forecast error 
variables use data from the Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System 
(I/B/E/S) database. 
CRSP, IBES 
State Local 
Institutional 
Ownership  
Local IO  
Local institutional ownership is the fraction of shares outstanding of firms 
headquartered in the state held by institutional investors headquartered in 
the state. The local IO indicator is equal to 1 when the local IO for the state 
is above the sample median during the quarter and 0 otherwise. 
13(f) Thomson 
Reuters, Compact 
Disclosure 
State Local minus 
Non-Local Trading  
Rel Local 
Trading 
The Rel Local Trading indicator is equal to 1 when the difference between 
changes in value of local and non-local IO for the state is in the top or 
bottom quintile during the quarter and 0 otherwise. 
13(f) Thomson 
Reuters, Compact 
Disclosure 
State Rural population  Rural Indicator variable equal to 1 when the fraction of state population living in rural areas is above the sample median during the quarter and 0 otherwise. Census  
Pre-decimalization 
Period PreDecimal Indicator variable equal to 1 for years prior to 2001 and 0 otherwise.  
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Table A1 – Relation between State Quarterly Liquidity and Components of Economic Activity 
Index. 
The table reports predictive linear regression estimates for the relation between the aggregate liquidity of 
stocks headquartered in the state and the components of the state-level economic activity index. The 
dependent variable is one of the state-quarter liquidity measures, State Amihud Illiquidity or State Relative 
Spread. The main independent variables are State Inc Gr, State Rel Unemp, and State hy. The panel 
specifications also include US Inc Gr, US Rel Unemp, US hy, Term Spread, and Default Spread, as well as 
state fixed effects, State FE. State Amihud Illiquidity and State Relative Spread are measured in quarter t, 
while all real macroeconomic predictors are measured in quarter t − 1. Other US-level predictors (i.e., term 
spread and default spread) are measured in quarter t – 1. Columns (1) and (3) report panel regression 
coefficient estimates and robust t-statistics in parentheses adjusted for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. 
The fit measure is the within-panel adjusted-R2. Columns (2) and (4) report time-series mean coefficients of 
Fama-MacBeth (1977) quarterly state-level cross-sectional regressions and Newey-West (1987) t-statistics in 
parentheses. The fit measure is the average cross-sectional adjusted-R2. See Appendix for details on 
definitions of variables. 
 
  State Amihud Illiquidity   State Relative Spread 
Panel FM Panel FM 
(1) (2) (3 (4) 
State Inc Gr -0.249 -0.392 -0.388 -0.120 
(-4.87) (-15.64) (-4.21) (-12.35) 
State Rel Unemp 0.098 0.087 0.052 0.005 
(2.03) (3.01) (0.97) (0.33) 
State hy -0.357 -0.078 -0.488 -0.074 
(-6.26) (-2.84) (-14.19) (-4.47) 
US Inc Gr -0.159 -0.055 
(-7.05) (-3.67) 
US Rel Unemp -0.186 -0.222 
(-3.54) (-4.00) 
US hy -0.164 -0.346 
(-3.53) (-9.31) 
Term Spread 0.235 0.113 
(6.05) (4.09) 
Default Spread -0.144 -0.092 
  (-4.51) (-3.76) 
State FE Yes NA Yes NA 
N [Avg N] 5,747 [49] 5,090 [48] 
Adj R2 [Avg R2] 24.2% [4.9%] 52.0% [9.0%] 
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Table A2 – Fama-MacBeth (1977) Estimates of the Relation between State Quarterly Liquidity 
and Economic Activity by Sub-Periods.  
This table reports predictive linear regression estimates for the relation between the aggregate liquidity of stocks 
headquartered in the state and state-level real economic conditions for six sub-periods, from 1980 through 2008. 
The dependent variable is the state-quarter average liquidity measure based on State Amihud Illiquidity or State 
Relative Spread. The independent variable is the lagged state economic activity index, State Econ Act. The 
reported coefficients for each sub-period are time-series means of Fama-MacBeth (1977) quarterly state-level 
cross-sectional regressions estimates. Newey-West (1987) corrected t-statistics are in parentheses. The fit 
measure is the average cross-sectional adjusted-R2. See Table 1 for further details on definitions of variables. 
 
    State 
Time Period   Amihud Illiquidity Relative Spread 
1980:Q1 to 1984:Q4 State Econ Act -0.948 -0.282 
(-9.32) (-6.16) 
1985:Q1 to 1989:Q4 State Econ Act -1.159 -0.168 
(-19.91) (-4.61) 
1990:Q1 to 1994:Q4 State Econ Act -0.349 -0.250 
(-5.32) (-7.68) 
1995:Q1 to 1999:Q4 State Econ Act -0.155 -0.174 
(-3.15) (-6.85) 
2000:Q1 to 2004:Q4 State Econ Act -0.329 -0.175 
(-8.64) (-5.47) 
2005:Q1 to 2008:Q4 State Econ Act -0.403 -0.235 
    (-8.30) (-17.82) 
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Table A3 – Relation between State Quarterly Liquidity and Economic Activity Using 
Alternative Liquidity Measures. 
The table reports regression estimates for the relation between the aggregate liquidity of stocks headquartered in 
the state and state-level real economic conditions. The dependent variable is one of the alternative state-quarter 
liquidity measures, State Corwin-Schultz Spread, State LOT, or State Turnover. State Corwin-Schultz Spread is 
the natural logarithm of the value-weighted mean Corwin-Schultz (2012) spread of firms headquartered in the 
state. For each stock-quarter, the firm spread is the mean daily high-low spread based on equations (14) and 
(18) in Corwin and Schultz (2012). Negative daily spread estimates are set to zero. State LOT (1999) is the 
natural logarithm of the value-weighted mean LOT of firms headquartered in the state. For each stock-quarter, 
the firm LOT is the ratio of the number of zero daily returns to the total number of daily returns within a quarter 
for the stock. State Turnover is the natural logarithm of the value-weighted mean turnover of firms 
headquartered in the state. For each stock-quarter, the firm turnover is the ratio of quarter aggregate trading 
volume divided by the number of shares outstanding at the beginning of the quarter. The main independent 
variables are State Econ Act, US Econ Act, Term Spread, and Default Spread. State Amihud Ind-Adj Illiquidity 
and State Relative Ind-Adj Spread are measured in quarter t, while all predictors are measured in quarter t − 1.  
Panel A – Summary statistics 
This panel reports summary statistics of the alternative state-quarter liquidity measures, State Corwin-Schultz 
Spread, State LOT, and State Turnover. 
Variable Mean St. Dev. 5% 25% Median 75% 95% 
State Corwin-Schultz Spread -4.836 0.433 -5.358 -5.134 -4.915 -4.641 -3.953 
State LOT -2.702 1.257 -4.952 -3.746 -2.231 -1.766 -1.25 
State Turnover -1.701 0.723 -2.853 -2.108 -1.724 -1.229 -0.552 
 
Panel B: Panel and Fama-MacBeth (1977) Regression Estimates. 
Columns (1), (3) and (5) report panel regression coefficient estimates and t-statistics in parentheses adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. All panel specifications include state fixed effects, State FE. The fit 
measure is the within-panel adjusted-R2. Columns (2), (4), and (6) report time-series mean coefficients of Fama-
MacBeth (1977) quarterly state-level cross-sectional regressions and Newey-West (1987) t-statistics in 
parentheses. The fit measure is the average cross-sectional adjusted-R2.  
  State CS Spread   State LOT   State Turnover 
Panel FM Panel FM Panel FM 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
State Econ Act -0.026 -0.184 -1.064 -0.208 0.521 0.177 
(-2.23) (-8.21) (-11.98) (-10.96) (9.22) (11.12) 
US Econ Act -0.054 -0.249 0.127 
(-2.71) (-5.54) (4.34) 
Term Spread -0.031 -0.105 0.071 
(-5.03) (-6.53) (6.55) 
Default Spread 0.061 -0.572 0.190 
  (5.83) (-20.24) (10.66) 
State FE Yes NA Yes NA Yes NA 
N [Avg N] 5,789 [45] 5,785 [50] 5,747 [49] 
Adj R2[Avg Adj R2] 4.7% [2.3%] 33.3% [3.6%] 26.3% [1.8%] 
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Table A4 – Relation between State Quarterly Liquidity and Economic Activity Using Industry-
Adjusted Liquidity. 
The table reports predictive linear regression estimates for the relation between the aggregate industry-adjusted 
liquidity of stocks headquartered in the state and state-level real economic conditions. The dependent variable is 
one of the industry-adjusted state-quarter liquidity measures, State Amihud Ind-Adj Illiquidity or State Relative 
Ind-Adj Spread. Industry-adjusted state-quarter liquidity is the value-weighted mean industry-adjusted liquidity 
of firms headquartered in the state during the quarter. Firm industry-adjusted liquidity is the natural logarithm of 
the stock-quarter liquidity minus the mean of the same variable across firms with the same 2-digit SIC code.  
The main independent variables are State Econ Act, US Econ Act, Term Spread, and Default Spread. State 
Amihud Ind-Adj Illiquidity and State Relative Ind-Adj Spread are measured in quarter t, while all predictors are 
measured in quarter t − 1.  
 
Panel A: Summary Statistics of State-Quarter Industry-Adjusted Liquidity.  
This panel reports mean, median, and standard deviation of the state-quarter industry-adjusted liquidity 
measures, State Amihud Ind-Adj Illiquidity or State Relative Ind-Adj Spread.  
 Mean St. Dev. Median 
State Ind-Adj Amihud Illiquidity   -3.583 2.036 -3.767 
State Ind-Adj Relative Spread -0.873 0.555 -0.898 
 
Panel B: Panel and Fama-MacBeth (1977) Regression Estimates. 
Columns (1) and (3) report panel regression coefficient estimates and t-statistics in parentheses adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. All panel specifications include state fixed effects, State FE. The fit 
measure is the within-panel adjusted-R2. Columns (2) and (4) report time-series mean coefficients of Fama-
MacBeth (1977) quarterly state-level cross-sectional regressions and Newey-West (1987) t-statistics in 
parentheses. The fit measure is the average cross-sectional adjusted-R2.  
  State IndAdj Amihud Illiquidity   State IndAdj Relative Spread 
Panel FM Panel FM 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
State Econ Act -0.344 -1.077 -0.308 -0.225 
(-3.02) (-12.24) (-9.66) (-15.43) 
US Econ Act -0.265 0.117 
(-3.69) (3.89) 
Term Spread -0.410 -0.088 
(-13.37) (-5.52) 
Default Spread 0.061 0.027 
  (1.49) (1.46) 
State FE Yes NA Yes NA 
N [Avg N] 5,746 [50] 5,083 [48] 
Adj R2 13.6% [6.6%] 9.2% [4.6%] 
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Table A5 – Relation between State Quarterly Liquidity and Economic Activity: Panel Estimates 
Excluding Large States and One-firm States. 
The table reports panel regression estimates for the relation between the aggregate liquidity of stocks 
headquartered in the state and the state economic activity excluding the states of Arkansas, California, New 
York, Texas, and Washington. The dependent variable is one of the state-quarter liquidity measures, State 
Amihud Illiquidity or State Relative Spread. The main independent variables are State Inc Gr, State Rel Unemp, 
State hy, and State Econ Act. All specifications also include US Inc Gr, US Rel Unemp, US hy, US Econ Act, 
Term Spread, and Default Spread, as well as state fixed effects, State FE. State Amihud Illiquidity and State 
Relative Spread are measured in quarter t, while all real predictors are measured in quarter t – 2, and term and 
default spreads are measured in quarter t – 1. Robust t-statistics in parentheses adjusted for heteroskedasticity 
and serial correlation. The fit measure is the within-panel adjusted-R2. See Appendix for details on definitions of 
variables. 
 
  State Amihud Illiquidity   State Relative Spread 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
State Inc Gr -0.475 -0.924 
(-3.48) (-4.44) 
State Rel Unemp 0.074 0.007 
(1.41) (0.13) 
State hy -0.324 -0.447 
(-5.17) (-11.02) 
State Econ Act -0.684 -1.172 
(-6.13) (-12.28) 
US Inc Gr -0.151 -0.036 
(-6.01) (-2.16) 
US Rel Unemp -0.176 -0.183 
(-3.06) (-3.14) 
US hy -0.175 -0.359 
(-3.58) (-9.93) 
US Econ Act -0.093 -0.158 
(-1.13) (-1.95) 
Term Spread 0.221 0.145 0.079 -0.112 
(5.25) (3.98) (2.36) (-4.78) 
Default Spread -0.140 -0.316 -0.107 -0.320 
  (-4.17) (-7.76) (-4.22) (-11.18) 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 5,178 5,178 4,576 4,576 
Adj R2 22.5% 13.8% 54.6% 26.1% 
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Table A6 – Relation between U.S. Census Division Quarterly Liquidity and Economic Activity: 
Panel Estimates.  
This table reports predictive linear regression estimates for the relation between the aggregate liquidity of stocks 
headquartered in each of the four U.S. Census Divisions and region-level real economic conditions.  The 
dependent variable is one of the division-quarter liquidity measures, Region Amihud Illiquidity or Region 
Relative Spread. The main independent variable is Region Econ Act. Other independent variables are US Econ 
Act, Term Spread, and Default Spread. Region Amihud Illiquidity and Region Relative Spread are measured in 
quarter t, while all predictors are measured in quarter t − 1. All specifications include division fixed effects, 
Region FE. Robust t-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. The fit 
measure is the within-panel adjusted-R2. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Region Amihud Illiquidity 
Region Econ Act -0.316 -0.304 -0.244 
(-0.36) (-0.37) (-0.42) 
N 460 460 460 
Adj R2 0.5% 2.4% 22.1% 
Region Relative Spread 
Region Econ Act 0.082 0.128 0.147 
(0.07) (0.12) (0.15) 
N 420 420 420 
Adj R2 -0.2% 3.5% 9.1% 
US Econ Act No Yes Yes 
Term Spread No No Yes 
Default Spread No No Yes 
Region FE Yes Yes Yes 
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Table A7 – Relation between MSA Annual Liquidity and Economic Activity Using Alternative 
Liquidity Measures. 
The table reports regression estimates for the relation between the aggregate liquidity of stocks headquartered in 
the state and state-level real economic conditions. The dependent variable is one of the alternative state-year 
liquidity measures, State Corwin-Schultz Spread, State LOT, or State Turnover. State Corwin-Schultz Spread is 
the natural logarithm of the value-weighted mean Corwin-Schultz (2012) spread of firms headquartered in the 
state. For each stock-year, the firm spread is the mean daily high-low spread based on equations (14) and (18) in 
Corwin and Schultz (2012). Negative daily spread estimates are set to zero. State LOT (1999) is the natural 
logarithm of the value-weighted mean LOT of firms headquartered in the state. For each stock-year, the firm 
LOT is the ratio of the number of zero daily returns to the total number of daily returns within a year for the 
stock. State Turnover is the natural logarithm of the value-weighted mean turnover of firms headquartered in 
the state. For each stock-year, the firm turnover is the ratio of quarter aggregate trading volume divided by the 
number of shares outstanding at the beginning of the year. The main independent variables are State Econ Act, 
US Econ Act, Term Spread, and Default Spread. State Amihud Ind-Adj Illiquidity and State Relative Ind-Adj 
Spread are measured in year t, while all predictors are measured in year t − 1. Columns (1), (3) and (5) report 
panel regression coefficient estimates and t-statistics in parentheses adjusted for heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation. All panel specifications include state fixed effects, State FE. The fit measure is the within-panel 
adjusted-R2. Columns (2), (4), and (6) report time-series mean coefficients of Fama-MacBeth (1977) yearly 
state-level cross-sectional regressions and Newey-West (1987) t-statistics in parentheses. The fit measure is the 
average cross-sectional adjusted-R2.  
 
  MSA CS Spread   MSA LOT   MSA Turnover 
Panel FM Panel FM Panel FM 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
MSA Econ Act -0.113 -0.185 -0.113 -0.340 0.145 0.168 
(-3.94) (-2.28) (-2.14) (-3.10) (2.18) (2.64) 
US Econ Act -0.397 -1.306 0.452 
 
(-
16.96)   
(-42.91) 
  
(12.48) 
 
Term Spread -0.073 0.043 -0.058 
(-7.87) (3.18) (-4.72) 
Default Spread -0.034 -0.543 0.094 
  (-2.74) (-34.51) (5.35) 
MSA FE Yes NA Yes NA Yes NA 
N [Avg N] 4,783 [208] 4,771 [207] 4,793 [208] 
Adj R2[Avg Adj R2] 13.3% [6.0%] 42.1% [9.5%] 10.8% [2.1%] 
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Table A8 – Relation between State Quarterly Liquidity and Economic Activity by Firm 
Localness Controlling for State Portfolio Firm Size and Stock Returns-.  
The table reports predictive panel linear regression estimates similar to Table 5 in the main text when the model 
is expanded to include additional control variables: lagged liquidity and lagged mean market capitalization of 
the state portfolio, as well as its lagged, contemporaneous, and one-quarter-ahead value-weighted stock return. 
 
Panel A – Firm Localness based on Size.  
 
Small Large 
P-value 
Difference  
Small Large 
P-value 
Difference 
State Amihud Illiquidity State Relative Spread 
State Econ Act -0.532 -0.495 [0.11] -0.565 -0.547 [0.16] 
(-4.13) (-3.49) (-3.69) (-3.51) 
US Econ Act -0.187 -0.167 [0.07] -0.390 -0.446 [0.03] 
(-4.23) (-2.52) (-11.29) (-8.42) 
Term Spread   0.230 -0.107 [0.00] -0.068 -0.237 [0.00] 
(10.68) (-2.35) (-4.24) (-8.47) 
Default Spread -0.155 -0.121 [0.94] -0.196 -0.077 [0.00] 
(-5.22) (-2.82) (-9.24) (-2.68) 
State Market Cap   -0.925 -1.734 [0.00] -1.075   -1.336 [0.00] 
(-10.74) (-12.70) (-16.90) (-14.29) 
State Return Indext-1   -1.330   0.487 [0.00]   -0.197 -0.082 [0.70] 
(-9.34) (4.69) (-3.51) (-0.99) 
State Return Indext   -2.026   -1.836 [0.07] -1.058   -1.245 [0.12] 
(-14.25) (-14.77) (-11.79) (-14.85) 
State Return Indext+1 0.227   0.303 [0.00] -0.072 -0.168 [0.53] 
(1.47) (2.38) (-1.23) (-2.03) 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 5,723 5,002 5,059   4,070 
Adj R2 42.2% 62.0% 70.5% 66.8% 
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Table A8 – continued… 
Panel B – Firm Localness based on S&P500 Affiliation 
 
Non-S&P500 S&P500 
P-value 
Difference  
Non-S&P500 S&P500 
P-value 
Difference 
State Amihud Illiquidity State Relative Spread 
State Econ Act -0.328 -0.276 [0.09] -0.247 -0.208 [0.12] 
(-2.14) (-1.99) (-3.00) (-1.88) 
US Econ Act -0.124 -0.004 [0.06] -0.321 -0.511 [0.00] 
(-2.76) (-0.07) (-8.36) (-7.15) 
Term Spread 0.264 -0.124 [0.00] -0.079 -0.282 [0.00] 
(9.69) (-2.69) (-5.14) (-7.98) 
Default Spread -0.152   0.013 [0.00] -0.168 -0.046 [0.00] 
(-5.94) (0.31) (-8.33) (-1.22) 
State Market Cap -1.033 -1.933 [0.00]   -1.203 -1.444 [0.00] 
(-18.01) (-15.74) (-18.72) (-11.46) 
State Return Indext-1 -1.306 0.447 [0.00] -0.192   0.085 [0.14] 
(-10.15) (4.00) (-3.80) (0.82) 
State Return Indext   -1.616 -1.271 [0.01] -1.003   -1.096 [0.76] 
(-17.47) (-11.99) (-13.33) (-9.71) 
State Return Indext+1   -0.421   0.202 [0.00] -0.169 -0.212 [0.35] 
(-3.99) (1.75) (-2.65) (-1.95) 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 5,736 4,444 5,083 3,096 
Adj R2 46.8% 67.0% 74.3% 68.0% 
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Table A9 – Relation between State Quarterly Liquidity and Economic Activity Controlling for 
Exogenous Variation in Liquidity, State Portfolio Firm Size and Stock Returns.  
The table reports predictive panel linear regression estimates similar to Table 6 in the main text when the model 
is expanded to include additional control variables: lagged liquidity and lagged mean market capitalization of 
the state portfolio, as well as its lagged, contemporaneous, and one-quarter-ahead value-weighted stock return. 
 
State Amihud Illiquidity State Relative Spread 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
Rural Dummy 0.363 0.361 0.283 0.139   0.138 0.270 
(16.49) (16.27) (5.84) (11.47) (11.44) (11.01) 
PreDecimal Dummy 0.165   0.910 
(1.17) (9.60) 
Rural×PreDecimal 0.194 0.176 
(2.16) (6.20) 
State Econ Act -0.122 -0.117 -0.153 -0.132 -0.127 -0.099 
(-6.09) (-5.76) (-4.67) (-11.78) (-11.16) (-6.03) 
State Econ×Rural -0.227 -0.192 -0.129 -0.186 
(-2.61) (-2.01) (-3.26) (-4.37) 
State Econ×PreDecimal 0.052 0.025 
(1.25) (1.11) 
State Econ×Rural×PreDecimal -0.164 -0.182 
(-1.62) (-3.51) 
US Econ Act 0.009 0.010 0.015 -0.110 -0.109 -0.144 
(0.15) (0.16) (0.26) (-3.50) (-3.48) (-4.66) 
Term Spread 0.057 0.056 0.049 -0.128 -0.129 -0.032 
(1.71) (1.68) (1.42) (-5.33) (-5.35) (-1.35) 
Default Spread 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.002    0.002 0.016 
(1.22) (1.20) (1.21) (0.12) (0.11) (0.82) 
State Market Cap -1.389 -1.387 -1.386 -0.357 -0.355 -0.356 
(-71.96) (-70.72) (-70.58) (-32.96) (-32.71) (-33.33) 
State Return Indext-1 -0.590 -0.591 -0.593 -0.387 -0.388 -0.325 
(-5.12) (-5.13) (-5.14) (-5.67) (-5.67) (-4.83) 
State Return Indext -1.178 -1.177 -1.178 -0.798 -0.797 -0.758 
(-10.34) (-10.33) (-10.35) (-11.39) (-11.36) (-11.06) 
State Return Indext+1 0.225 0.225 0.230 0.036 0.036 -0.022 
(1.98) (1.98) (2.02) (0.51) (0.51) (-0.32) 
State FE Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
N 5,747 5,747 5,747 5,090 5,090 5,090 
Adj R2 71.7% 71.7% 71.7% 87.3% 87.3% 87.7% 
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Table A10 – Relation between State Quarterly Liquidity and Economic Activity, Conditional on 
Local Capital Market Conditions and Controlling for State Portfolio Firm Size, Stock Returns, 
and Lagged Liquidity.  
The table reports predictive panel linear regression estimates similar to Table 8 in the main text when the model 
is expanded to include additional control variables: lagged liquidity and lagged mean market capitalization of 
the state portfolio, as well as its lagged, contemporaneous, and one-quarter-ahead value-weighted stock return. 
 
 
  Panel Estimates 
 
State Amihud Illiquidity  State Relative Spread 
(1) (2)  (3) (4) 
State Econ Act -0.100 -0.138  0.090 0.099 
(-0.98) (-1.99)  (0.51) (1.00) 
State Fund Constraint (SF)  0.009    0.117 
(0.20)  (2.73) 
State Opacity (SO) 0.414 0.256  1.420 0.988 
(4.99) (3.37)  (11.65) (10.97) 
State Local IO (SL) 0.095 0.075  0.098 0.165 
(1.10) (0.92)  (0.90) (2.34) 
State Rel Local Trade (SR)  -0.051 -0.049  0.016 0.027 
(-1.79) (-1.55)  (0.53) (0.98) 
State Econ Act×SF -0.103  -0.124 
(-2.64)  (-1.87) 
State Econ Act×SO -0.073   -0.165  -0.167 -0.062 
(-1.00) (-1.85)  (-1.12) (-0.64) 
State Econ Act×SL -0.091 -0.152  -0.201 -0.346 
(-1.98) (-2.14)  (-2.02) (-2.52) 
State Econ Act×SR -0.183 -0.154    -0.120 -0.290 
(-2.01) (-2.57)  (-1.99) (-3.81) 
State Market Cap -0.699 -0.823  -0.547 -0.718 
(-10.47) (-15.28)  (-5.44) (-14.49) 
State Return Indext-1 -1.448 -1.148    -0.072 -0.164 
(-8.57) (-10.00)  (-0.46) (-2.49) 
State Return Indext 0.261 3.095  24.593 1.603 
(0.02) (1.45)  (1.25) (1.39) 
State Return Indext+1 -0.081 -2.978  -24.564 -1.571 
  (-0.01) (-1.40)  (-1.25) (-1.38) 
N [Avg N] 949 4,502  949 4,472 
Adj R2 [Avg R2] 63.4% 56.2%  75.2% 70.4% 
US Econ Act Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
US Econ Act×Dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Term & Default Spreads Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
State FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
 
 
